Abstract: In the context of extreme climate change, we ask how to conduct expected utility analysis in the presence of catastrophic risks. Economists typically model decision making under risk and uncertainty by expected utility with constant relative risk aversion (power utility); statisticians typically model economic catastrophes by probability distributions with heavy tails. Unfortunately, the expected utility framework is fragile with respect to heavy-tailed distributional assumptions. We specify a stochastic economyclimate model with power utility and explicitly demonstrate this fragility. We derive necessary and sufficient compatibility conditions on the utility function to avoid fragility and solve our stochastic economy-climate model for two examples of such compatible utility functions. We further develop and implement a procedure to learn the input parameters of our model and show that the model thus specified produces quite robust optimal policies. The numerical results indicate that higher levels of uncertainty (heavier tails) lead to less abatement and consumption, and to more investment, but this effect is not unlimited.
Introduction
An economist, when asked to model decision making under risk and uncertainty for normative purposes, would typically work within the expected utility framework with constant relative risk aversion (that is, power utility). A statistician, on the other hand, would model economic catastrophes through probability distributions with heavy tails. Unfortunately, expected utility is fragile with respect to heavy-tailed distributional assumptions: expected utility may fail to exist or it may imply conclusions that are 'incredible'.
Economists have long been aware of this tension between the expected utility paradigm and distributional assumptions (Menger, 1934) , and the discussions in Arrow (1974) , Ryan (1974) , and Fishburn (1976) deal explicitly with the trade-off between the richness of the class of utility functions and the generality of the permitted distributional assumptions. Compelling examples in Geweke (2001) corroborate the fragility of the existence of expected power utility with respect to minor changes in distributional assumptions.
The combination of heavy-tailed distributions and the power utility family may not only imply infinite expected utility, but also infinite expected marginal utility, and hence, via the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (the pricing kernel), lead to unacceptable conclusions in cost-benefit analyses. For example, with heavy-tailed log-consumption and power utility, the representative agent should postpone any unit of current consumption to mitigate future catastrophes. The latter aspect was recently emphasized by Weitzman (2009) in the context of catastrophic climate change. Weitzman also argues that attempts to avoid this unacceptable conclusion will necessarily be non-robust.
In this paper we study the fundamental question of how to conduct expected utility analysis in the presence of catastrophic risks, in the context of extreme climate change. Our paper is built on four beliefs, which will recur in our analysis:
Catastrophic risks are important. To study risks that can lead to catastrophe is important in many areas, for example financial (trader, insurer, bank) distress, traffic accidents (bridge collapse, airplane crash, flight control system failure), dike bursts, killer asteroids, nuclear power plant disasters, and extreme climate change. Such low-probability high-impact events should not be ignored in cost-benefit analyses for policy making. In the context of extreme climate change: catastrophic climate changes, unlikely as they may be, should be accounted for in expected-welfare calculations for policy making.
A good model 'in the center' is not necessarily good 'at the edges'. Suppose we have estimated a function C = a+bY , relating consumption to disposable income. The dots in Figure 1 between 40 and 80, the consumption function can be well approximated by the regression line. How useful is this result for very low (or very high) incomes? Not very useful. For very low incomes, predicted consumption would be negative! This does not mean that a linear consumption function is useless. But it is only useful in the center of the domain. This is simply because models are not truths but approximations, and approximations may not work well if we move too far away from the point of approximation. In our context, the widely adopted class of power utility functions, often appropriate when one considers large inputs remote from zero as is common in macroeconomics and finance, may not work well for decision making under heavy-tailed risks with non-negligible support beyond the usual domains. Moreover, estimates of the coefficient of risk aversion are very sensitive to the particular domain of inputs that a utility function operates on (Rabin, 2000, footnote 10) .
The price to reduce catastrophic risk is finite. Are we willing to spend everything to avoid children being killed at a dangerous street? Or to avoid the dikes to burst? Or a power plant to explode? Or a killer asteroid to hit the Earth? Or climate to change rapidly? No, we are not. To assume the opposite (that a society would be willing to offer all its current wealth to avoid or mitigate catastrophic risks) is not credible, not even from a normative (prescriptive, rational) perspective. In our context, there is a limit to the amount of current consumption that the representative agent is willing to give up in order to obtain one additional certain unit of future consumption, no matter how extreme and irreversible climate change may be. In other words: the expected pricing kernel is finite.
Light-tailed risks may result in heavy-tailed risk. When x is normally distributed (light tails) then 1/x has no moments (heavy tails). Also, when x is normally distributed then e x has finite moments, but when x follows a Student distribution then e x has no moments. In the context of extreme climate change: temperature has fluctuations but one would not expect heavy tails in its distribution. This does not, however, imply that functions of temperature cannot have heavy tails. For example, it may well be reasonable to use heavy-tailed distributional assumptions to model future (log) consumption.
There is an important literature on stochastic economy-climate models (see, for example, Keller et al., 2004, Mastrandrea and Schneider, 2004 , and the references therein). However, the integrated assessment models of climate economics are predominantly deterministic and rarely incorporate catastrophic risk (Ackerman et al., 2010) . To allow for uncertainty and extreme climate change, we start by specifying a stochastic economy-climate model that builds on Nordhaus' (2008) deterministic dynamic integrated climate and economy (DICE) model. We solve the model first with power utility and light-tailed distributional assumptions and prove that the assumption of expected power utility is incompatible with heavy-tailed distributional assumptions. We then address the question of how to conduct expected utility analysis in the presence of catastrophic risks. In Appendix C we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the utility function, so that expected utility and expected marginal utility (hence the pricing kernel) are finite, also under heavy-tailed distributional assumptions. Restricting attention to utility functions that satisfy these compatibility conditions, we propose the two-parameter 'Burr' function as a particularly appealing utility function in our setting. We solve our stochastic economy-climate model with Burr utility (and also with the well-known exponential utility) under both light-tailed and heavy-tailed distributional assumptions.
Completing the resulting model requires specifying a number of model parameters as inputs. These parameters cannot 'simply' be determined by conventional statistical inference based on historical data. One reason is that temperature and other variables will be affected by economic policy decisions; another that economic parameters should be set so as to reflect rational decision-making behavior under circumstances that have never been encountered before. We discuss how to set the model parameters in a process towards agreement, using experts' priors on parameter values, and learning about parameters from resulting optimal model output. The key to the learning and agreement process is the translation of model parameters that are relatively difficult to interpret into quantities that allow a more straightforward interpretation. We find that our optimal policies are quite robust with respect to minor (and reasonable) changes to the input parameters.
Our numerical analysis indicates that allowing for heavy-tailed distributional assumptions in extreme climate change modeling leads to a reduction of current abatement and consumption and to an increase in current investment, when compared to a deterministic analysis. The increase in current investment may be interpreted via precautionary savings. Most notably and contrary to Weitzman (2009) , while the differences are visible, they are not unlimited.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we propose a simplified version of Nordhaus' economy-climate model. There are two new features to this model: scrap value functions and, more importantly, uncertainty. In Section 3 we specialize this model to two periods only, and maximize expected welfare with non-linear scrap value functions. We also prove that expected welfare exists under normality but not under a Student distribution (Appendix B). Motivated by the fact that the expectation of the pricing kernel is finite for all outcome distributions whenever the concavity index (index of absolute risk aversion) ARA(x) is bounded (which we formally prove in Appendix C), we discuss such utility functions in Section 4: the well-known exponential function and the less well-known 'Burr' function. Section 5 discusses how we can learn the parameters of our model and calibrate policy using information such as the probability of catastrophe, and reports on robustness tests. Section 6 concludes. There are three appendices. Appendix A provides the Kuhn-Tucker conditions; Appendix B contains the proof of Proposition 3.1; and Appendix C discusses expected utility and tail uncertainty in a more general setting.
A simple stochastic economy-climate model
Our framework is a simple economy-climate model in the spirit of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) and Nordhaus (2008) .
Emissions, temperature, and the economy
Everybody works. In period t, the labor force L t together with the capital stock K t generate GDP Y t through a Cobb-Douglas production function
where A t represents technological efficiency and γ is the elasticity of capital. Capital is accumulated through
where I t denotes investment and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. Production generates carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions E t :
where σ t denotes the emissions-to-output ratio for CO2, and µ t is the abatement fraction for CO2. The associated CO2 concentration M t accumulates through
where φ is the depreciation rate of CO2 (rate of removal from the atmosphere). Temperature H t develops according to
In each period t, the fraction of GDP not spent on abatement or 'damage' is either consumed (C t ) or invested (I t ) along the budget constraint
The temperature-impact function d t depends only on temperature and satisfies 0 < d t ≤d t , whered t represents the optimal temperature for the economy. Deviations from the optimal temperature cause damage. We specify d t as
For very high and very low temperatures d t approaches zero. The optimal value of d t occurs at H t = 0 (the temperature in 1900, as in Nordhaus) when d t =d t . Hence, 'net' output d t Y t is a fraction, not of Y t as in Nordhaus, but ofd t Y t , the output achievable under optimal climate conditions. A fraction ω t of d t Y t is spent on abatement, and we specify the abatement cost fraction as
If µ t increases then so does ω t , and a larger fraction of GDP will be spent on abatement. These equations capture the essence of the Nordhaus (2008) DICE model. The model includes stock variables L t , K t , M t , and H t , fractions ω t and µ t , and scale variables A t , d t , σ t , and ψ t , all measured at the beginning of period t; and flow variables Y t , C t , I t , and E t , all measured in period t (not in year t). Notice that L t is a stock, not a flow. As in Nordhaus (2008) one period is ten years. We choose the exogenous variables such that L t > 0, A t > 0, σ t > 0, and 0 < ψ t < 1. The policy variables must satisfy
With these restrictions all variables will have the correct signs and all fractions will lie between zero and one.
Utility and welfare
Given a utility function U we define welfare in period t as
If the policy maker has an infinite horizon, then he/she will maximize total discounted welfare,
where ρ denotes the discount rate. Letting x denote per capita consumption, the utility function U(x) is assumed to be defined and strictly concave for all x > 0. There are many such functions, but a popular choice is
where α denotes the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. This is the so-called power function. If we define
then its coefficient of absolute risk aversion ARA(x) = α/x is decreasing and its coefficient of relative risk aversion RRA(x) = α is constant. The power function may be popular, but it does have drawbacks. In particular, we have RRA(0) > 0, which implies that the expected pricing kernel may not exist in the presence of heavy tails (Appendix C). Later we shall therefore consider other utility functions as well. The power function is bounded from below, but not from above when 0 < α < 1; and it is bounded from above, but not from below when α > 1. When α = 1 we have U(x) = log(x), which is unbounded from below and above. Many authors, including Nordhaus (2008) , choose α = 2. Also popular is α = 1 (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999; Stern, 2007) . Our interest is in maximizing welfare W with respect to the policy bundles (C t , I t , µ t ) for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . In Table 1 we present the parameters and initial values used. These values are chosen such that our results closely resemble the results obtained by Nordhaus (2008) , when applied within the same 60-period (600-year) DICE framework. We choose the exogenous variables L t , A t , σ t , and ψ t as in Nordhaus (2008) , and we letd t = 1 and α = 2.
Our GAMS code (http://center.uvt.nl/staff/magnus/catastrophe) then produces optimal values over sixty periods that are very close to the values obtained in Nordhaus, as shown in Table 2 . Hence it appears that our simplified version of the DICE model (hereafter, SICE = simplified DICE) 
Uncertainty
So far we have ignored uncertainty. There is however much uncertainty in the economics of climate change (Manne and Richels, 1992; Nordhaus, 1994; Weitzman, 2009 ). There is model uncertainty, parameter uncertainty, and uncertainty about the possible reduction of parametric variability over time (updating); see Kelly and Kolstad (1999) and Leach (2007) . We model uncertainty through stochasticity. In the literature, stochasticity is typically introduced through the damage function (Roughgarden and Schneider, 1999; Mastrandrea and Schneider, 2004) or through a random shock in temperature (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999; Leach, 2007) . We follow this literature by introducing stochasticity through the temperature-impact function d t , more precisely throughd t , the impact under optimal temperature. We are uncertain about the optimal temperature, because we are uncertain about the correctness of the functional form of d t , about the values of the parameters, and about the underlying temperature equation. We capture these three sources of uncertainty by writinḡ
where ǫ t denotes a random error with mean zero and variance one. This implies that 'net GDP' is given by
so that random noise enters the Cobb-Douglas production function in the usual 'linear' way when we write log(
If ǫ t follows a normal distribution N(0, 1), then the moments ofd t exist, and we have E(d t ) = 1 and var(d t ) = e τ 2 − 1. Since the distribution ofd t is heavily skewed, its expectation is larger than its median, and hence more uncertainty (higher τ ) implies more probability mass ofd t close to zero, and a higher probability of damage. If, however, we move only one step away from the normal distribution and assume that ǫ t follows a Student distribution with any (finite) degrees of freedom, then the expectation is infinite (Geweke, 2001 
Scrap values
If the policy maker has a T -period policy horizon, then we write welfare as
where x t = C t /L t denotes per capita consumption in period t. If {x * t } denotes the optimal path for {x t }, then we define the scrap value as
Maximizing W is then equivalent to maximizing
The scrap value S T will depend on the state variables at time T , in particular K T and M T , and this functional relationship is the scrap value function:
If T is large we may ignore the scrap value S T because of the large discount factor (1 + ρ)
T . But if T is small, then we need to model S T explicitly, thus emphasizing the fact that the policy maker has the double objective of maximizing discounted welfare over a finite number of periods T , while also leaving a reasonable economy for the next policy maker, based on the remaining capital stock and CO2 concentration.
The simplest approximation to S T is the linear function
where ν 1 and ν 2 denote the scrap prices of capital and pollution at the beginning of period T . This scrap value function captures the idea that the next government will be happier if there is more capital and less pollution at the beginning of its policy period. But the linear scrap value function has some problems. These are discussed in Ikefuji et al. (2010a) , where we also propose the non-linear scrap value function,
where ν 1 > 0, ν 2 > 0, p > 0, and q > 1. This function is strictly concave, bounded from above, and approaching −∞ when either
In addition, it has the property that if we linearize
so that ν 1 and ν 2 can be interpreted as scrap prices, just as in the linear case.
A two-period model with CRRA preferences
The simplest version of the model occurs when T = 2 in which case we have only two periods. We can write welfare in this case as
The two-period model, which we will consider henceforth, captures the essence of our problem while remaining numerically tractable in the presence of uncertainty. In this section the utility function is given by U(x) = 1−1/x (power utility with α = 2), the random errors ǫ t are generated by a normal N(0, 1) distribution, and the policy restrictions (2) are explicitly imposed, so that we maximize a restriction of expected welfare; see Appendix A. Randomness results from d 1 only, because the temperature-impact d 0 at the beginning of period 0 is known to us (we setd 0 = 1, equal to its expectation), and d 2 at the end of period 1 does not appear in the welfare function. Hence, the only source of randomness is caused by the error ǫ 1 . The policy maker has to choose the policy bundles (C 0 , I 0 , µ 0 ) at the beginning of period 0 and (C 1 , I 1 , µ 1 ) at the beginning of period 1 that will maximize expected welfare.
We need values for the exogenous variables L t , A t , σ t , and ψ t . These are given in Table 3 . Since a linear scrap value function is not realistic, because the combination of a half-bounded utility function and an unbounded scrap (8) with
Finally, we need sensible values for the uncertainty parameter τ . The stochasticity, as given in (6), captures uncertainty about GDP that is due to uncertainty about climate change. Historical variation in GDP may therefore serve as an initial upper bound proxy for τ . Barro (2009) calibrates the standard deviation of log GDP to a value of 0.02 on an annual basis. Over a 10-year horizon this would correspond to about 0.06, under normality. Barro, however, only considers rich (OECD) countries, which means that for our purposes this value needs to be scaled up.
In Figure 2 we plot the density ofd 1 for three values of τ : 0.1, 0.3, and 0.7, both when ǫ 1 follows a N(0, 1) distribution (solid line) and when ǫ 1 = 4/5 t, where t follows a Student distribution with 10 degrees of freedom. Notice that E(ǫ 1 ) = 0 and var(ǫ 1 ) = 1 in both cases. When τ = 0.1, we see that almost 100% of the distribution ofd 1 lies in the interval (0.5, 2.0), both for the N(0, 1) distribution and for the t(10) distribution. When τ = 0.3, 97.8% (97.2% for the Student distribution) lies in the interval (0.5, 2.0); and, when τ = 0.7, only 64.9% (67.2% for the Student distribution) lies in this interval. We conclude that τ = 0.7 may serve as a credible upper bound for the uncertainty range, and hence we report our results for τ = 0.0, 0.3, and 0.7.
Realizing that at the beginning of period 1 the temperature-impact d 1 is observed based on the realization of ǫ 1 , the policy maker will maximize expected welfare in three steps as follows. First, he/she maximizes welfare 
and under the restriction (2). This gives (µ * 1 , C * 1 ) and concentrated welfare Tables 1 and 3 , and the four parameter values in the non-linear scrap value function given above, we obtain the results presented in Table 4 . We note here and in subsequent tables that Y 0 = 556.67 and d 0 = 0.9985 are constant over different scenarios and functions, and that the values of µ 0 , C 0 ,
, and H 2 are optimal functions of ǫ 1 . What we present in the tables are their expectations. For τ = 0 there is no uncertainty. For τ > 0 there is uncertainty, and all policy variables are affected when τ increases. More uncertainty results in less abatement, less consumption, and more investment in period 0, and to more abatement, consumption, and investment in period 1. In period 1, the changes in abatement and consumption are negligible. The increase in I 0 with τ can be explained by precautionary savings. The restriction on I 1 can be viewed as a penalty for negative investment. To avoid this penalty, the policy maker can increase the budget in period 1 by investing more in period 0. As the amount of uncertainty increases, the probability of negative investment increases, ceteris paribus. In response, the policy maker increases investment at the expense of abatement and consumption in period 0. The increase in I 0 leads to higher output in period 1, which explains the increases in I 1 , K 2 , M 2 , and H 2 . The decrease in µ 0 leads to higher emissions in period 0, and increases carbon concentration and temperature in period 1. An additional reason why investment in period 1 increases with uncertainty is that positive shocks translate into possibly unlimited upward shocks in I 1 , but negative shocks will never cause I 1 to drop below zero.
We need to show that the expectation of welfare exists for power utility. The following proposition states not only this but also that, if we move one step away from normality and assume a Student distribution with any finite degrees of freedom, then the expectation does not exist.
Proposition 3.1 With power utility, expected welfare exists under normality but not under a Student distribution.
The proof of Proposition 3.1 is in Appendix B. It follows that the much-used power utility function is inconsistent with expected utility theory with heavy tails, not because utility theory itself is at fault but because power utility is inappropriate when tails are heavy.
Catastrophic risk and compatibility

Expected utility and catastrophic risk
Since the axiomatization of expected utility (EU) by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Savage (1954) numerous objections have been raised against it. Most of these relate to empirical evidence that the behavior of agents under risk and uncertainty does not agree with EU. Indeed there is much evidence that for descriptive applications the Von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms are violated systematically. Motivated by such empirical evidence, various alternative theories have emerged, usually coined 'nonexpected utility' theories; see Sugden (1997) for a review. Starting with the Allais paradox in the 1950s, problems involving low-probability high-impact outcomes have played a central role in non-expected utility. This is particularly, but not exclusively, evident in the rank-dependent class of models such as Kahneman and Tversky's cumulative prospect theory.
One option in our context would be to dismiss EU and replace it by a non-expected utility theory. While this could conceivably, at least partially, solve the problem of maximizing EU for catastrophic risks (in particular, the existence of moments), it might also aggravate the problems. Non-expected utility theories, most notably prospect theory, account for the fact that people are limited in their ability to comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities, so that highly unlikely events are either ignored or overweighted. But, for normative purposes, it is dangerous to ignore or overweight highly unlikely events, and policy makers should choose a framework where this is avoided.
Despite important developments in non-expected utility theory, EU remains the dominant normative decision theory (Broome, 1991; Sims, 2001; Dhami and Al-Nowaihi, 2010) , and the current paper stays within the framework of EU. Our results presented below corroborate the fact that expected utility theory may reliably provide normatively appealing results, also in the presence of catastrophic risks. Nevertheless, one may legitimately question whether EU is the appropriate normative theory for decision making under catastrophic risks and continue a search for better theories; see also Chichilnisky (2000) .
In Appendix C we derive necessary and sufficient conditions on the utility function to ensure that expected utility and expected marginal utility (hence also the expected pricing kernel) are finite, also in the presence of heavy tails. These results are generally applicable to standard multi-period welfare maximization problems. This is important, because if the expected pricing kernel is infinite, then the amount of consumption in period 0 which the representative agent is willing to give up in order to obtain one additional certain unit of consumption in period 1 is infinite. This is not credible and, following our discussion in the Introduction, we argue that such a view of life is unreasonable and has extreme irrational implications in our setting. The price we are willing to pay to avoid a global economy-climate catastrophe is finite.
Propositions C.2 and C.3 underline the importance of a compatible specification of the concavity index, especially in the presence of catastrophic risk. We note in this context that the concavity index is to be specified as input, and need not be estimated, though it may be learned, that is, implicitly elicited (see Section 5 below). In what follows, we will provide translations of the concavity index parameters into quantities that allow a more straightforward interpretation. These translations can then serve as handles to set the input parameters. Quantities with a relatively simple meaning will be the key to the process of learning about the concavity index parameters.
Compatibility: Non-normality and Burr utility
Motivated by the conditions derived in Appendix C and by the fundamental insight that the economic model and the statistical model must be compatible, and because we wish to leave distributional assumptions unrestricted at this stage, we consider two bounded utility functions: the exponential function and the 'Burr' function. (Other choices are permitted but may require restrictions on distributional assumptions.) The exponential utility function is given by
with ARA(x) = β and RRA(x) = βx, and the Burr utility function by
with ARA(x) = (k + 1)/(x + λ) and RRA(x) = (k + 1)x/(x + λ). Both functions are members of the HARA class of utility functions. The Burr function, based on Burr (1942) and Burr and Cislak (1968) , was proposed in Ikefuji et al. (2010b) , where it is also shown that this function is particularly appropriate as an approximation to a bounded utility function and enjoys a combination of appealing properties especially relevant in heavy-tailed risk analysis. This is exemplified in Figure 3 , where we plot RRA and ARA for The parameter choice is determined by the point x * , where we want the three functions to be close. Suppose we want the functions to be close at x * = 0.08, which is approximately the value of C 0 /L 0 and C 1 /L 1 . Then, given that α = 2, we find β = 2/x * = 25, and, for any k > 1, λ = (k − 1)x * /2. Intertemporal preferences are jointly determined by the RRA parameters (α, β, k, λ) and the discount rate ρ. In our case we keep ρ constant and choose the RRA-ARA parameters appropriately according to the above closeness criterium.
The power function has RRA(0) > 0 and ARA(0) = ∞, while the RRA in the exponential function is unbounded for large x. In contrast, the RRA in the Burr function is bounded between 0 and k + 1, it satisfies RRA(0) = 0, and ARA(0) is finite (125 in the figure) . Notice that the fact that RRA(0) = 0 (as is the case for the exponential and the Burr utility functions) does not imply that the representative agent is risk-neutral at x = 0. For example, we have ARA(0) = β for the exponential function and ARA(0) = (k + 1)/λ for the Burr function. Also, the derivative RRA ′ is zero for the power function, constant for the exponential function, and monotonically decreasing from (k + 1)/λ to zero for the Burr function. Hence the slope of the Burr function at x = 0 is finite.
The Burr function is attractive because it lies in-between the power and exponential functions. It exhibits exponential-like features when x is close to zero (with RRA(0) = 0, ARA(0) < ∞, and U(0) > −∞), hence satisfies the compatibility conditions derived in Appendix C; and power-like features in the middle and on the right-side of the distribution. Relative concepts are useful away from zero but not close to zero, and this is why power utility does not work well in near-catastrophe scenarios. Indeed, in the insurance literature exponential utility is typically used (Gerber, 1979 , Chapter 5). Using GAMS and without uncertainty, we maximize welfare over sixty periods (600 years) for both the exponential and Burr utility functions, and a selection of the resulting optimal values is shown in Table 5 . When we compare the results with those in Table 2 , we see that the optimal stock values from the Burr function closely resemble the optimal stock values from the power function, but not those from the exponential function. In contrast to power and Burr, where RRA flattens out, the RRA for the exponential distribution continues to increase (Figure 3) , and hence the growth rate of marginal utility continues to increase as well. As x increases, consumption will therefore increase, and investment and abatement will decrease. As a result, C/Y is relatively large for exponential utility. The low growth rate of capital (for exponential utility) leads to a low growth rate of output. However, since more consumption leads to less abatement, the growth rate of CO2 concentration is high even when the amount of production is low. Consequently, M and H are high compared to power and Burr. When x < x * , RRA (Burr) is close to RRA (exponential), so that more is consumed and less invested when the Burr function is used instead of the power function. But when x > x * , RRA (Burr) is close to RRA (power). The optimal path of K is slightly lower and the optimal paths of M and H are slightly higher for Burr than for power utility.
The scrap value function for both utility functions, developed in Ikefuji et al. (2010a) , is defined as
with
where p > 0, q > 0, c > 1, λ 1 > 0, and λ 2 > 0, and we have again normalized ν 1 > 0 and ν 2 > 0 such that
The values of the calibrated parameters for the scrap value functions in the case of exponential utility are ν 1 = 8.0282, ν 2 = 0.1487, and p = 0.85, q = 0.55, c = 1.65, λ 1 = 0.0936, λ 2 = 0.0415.
The optimal values of the policy and other variables obtained from maximizing expected welfare are presented in Table 6 . In contrast to Table 5 , the results in Table 6 (and Table 7 ) allow for uncertainty, consider the short run (two periods) rather than the long run (sixty periods), and also take scrap values into account. Since exponential utility is calibrated to be close to power utility at x = x * , the results for the two utility functions do not differ greatly. This is especially true for τ = 0, where only the abatement fraction µ is higher for exponential utility, and therefore temperature H is lower.
When τ increases, I 0 increases less and I 1 increases more for exponential than for power. Moreover, as the uncertainty parameter τ increases, M 2 does not change much in the exponential case, while it increases in the power case. The effect of uncertainty on the marginal scrap values is therefore larger in the exponential case than in the power case. As in Table 4 , more uncertainty results in less abatement, less consumption, and more investment in period 0, and to more abatement, and investment in period 1. Suppose now that the underlying distribution has heavier tails: Student instead of normal. We have normalized the variance of the Student distribution to be one, and therefore the first three moments of ǫ 1 are the same as under normality. The kurtosis, however, is now slightly higher: 4 instead of 3 (assuming 10 degrees of freedom). Under power utility, expected welfare does not exist any more. But under bounded utility, expected welfare always exists. The effect of the excess kurtosis on the optimal values is relatively small. It is important to realize that, while the Student distribution features excess kurtosis, it remains quite close to the normal distribution (see also Figure 2 ). Hence it would be unreasonable if a 'small' change in distributional assumptions would lead to a large possibly 'discontinuous' change in optimal policies.
All variables move in the same direction as before when τ increases. Notice that some variables (C 1 , I 1 , and K 2 ) have infinite expectations even though expected welfare is finite. This is no surprise because these variables are unbounded and depend ond 1 = e −τ 2 /2 e τ ǫ 1 . When ǫ 1 follows a Student distribution, E(d 1 ) = ∞ and this property carries over to the other three variables. Let us now consider a second bounded utility function, the appealing Burr function. For Burr utility the following parameter values were calibrated for the scrap value functions: ν 1 = 2.8884, ν 2 = 0.0366, and p = 0.6, q = 0.5, c = 1.5, λ 1 = 0.1631, λ 2 = 0.0502.
The optimal values are presented in Table 7 . In view of Figure 3 we would expect that Burr and power are relatively close in the observed data range. This is indeed the case as a comparison of Tables 7 and 4 reveals. There is little difference between the two tables in the case of no uncertainty, and also when τ increases. The effect of excess kurtosis is again small, as it should be.
The important difference between power and Burr utility is not revealed in our typically observed data. It is only revealed when low levels of per capita consumption become relevant, that is, in near-catastrophe cases. This is clarified in Figure 4 , where we present µ 1 as a function of ǫ 1 for τ = 0.3. The expected value of µ 1 is 0.1141 for power utility under normality (Table 4) , and 0.1135 for Burr utility under either normality or Student(10) ( Table 7 ). This is not very different. But for values of ǫ 1 further away from 0 the difference is large. 
Learning and agreement
To complete the model we need to specify our input parameters. We show how this can be achieved in a process towards agreement, using experts' priors. The key to this learning and agreement process is the translation of model parameters that are relatively difficult to interpret into quantities that allow a more straightforward interpretation. The process is applicable not only in the current context of extreme climate change, but also in many other policy making settings involving catastrophic risks. Our parameters cannot be estimated using conventional methods and historical data, but experts will have prior ideas about these parameters. Different experts will have different priors. Model output can be generated on the basis of various priors. Then, in an iterative procedure, one learns about the parameter values from experts' opinions and model output, and an agreeable intersection of model parameters may be reached.
This process is illustrated in Figure 5 . In the left panel, we visualize the contributions of two experts. One expert states that the value of input 2 should be bounded as indicated by the two vertical lines. The other expert provides a lower and upper bound for the value of input 1, depending on the value of input 2. The horizontally-shaded area gives the combinations input 2 input 1 output 2 output 1 Figure 5 : The decision making process of inputs that are acceptable to both experts. The right panel is more complicated. We first visualize the contributions of two policy makers regarding two output variables. This is the vertically-shaded area, giving the combinations of outputs that are acceptable to both policy makers. Next we map the left panel onto the right panel. For every acceptable combination of inputs the model provides one combination of outputs, that is, one point in the right panel. The horizontally-shaded area in the right panel is the image of the horizontally-shaded area in the left panel. We now have two areas in the right panel: the vertically-shaded area and the horizontally-shaded area. If the two areas do not intersect, then the experts and policy makers must adjust their priors in an iterative process of learning. Once the areas do intersect, agreement is possible. The black triangle then contains all points for which both inputs and outputs are acceptable. Agreement must be reached on the three policy variables (µ 0 , C 0 , I 0 ), and we recall that expected welfare is maximized in three steps as described in Section 3, yielding the optimal policy (µ * 0 , C * 0 , I * 0 ). Our analysis requires prior beliefs about various inputs, in particular: form of the utility function (Burr or otherwise), degree of risk-aversion (k, λ), discount rate (ρ), form of the distribution (Student or otherwise), and volatility (τ ). If agreement is to be reached, then the policy makers must be willing to adjust their individual priors on each of these inputs, based on the experts' opinions and the generated output.
Since extreme outcomes matter, the normal distribution is not appropriate. We want a distribution which allows heavier tails, such as the Student distribution. Given our treatment of stochasticity, power utility is not compatible with the Student distribution, because the required expectations don't exist. Also, exponential utility has the disadvantage that RRA increases without bound. Burr utility provides a useful compromise: it exhibits exponential-like features when per capita consumption is small, and power-like features otherwise. Let us then confine ourselves to Burr utility, assume that ǫ 1 follows a Student distribution, and take the following parameter values as our benchmark: k = 1.5, λ = 0.02 τ = 0.3, df = 10, ρ = 0.1605.
Note that the value of λ is linked to k through λ = 0.04(k − 1), as explained in Section 4. The symbol df denotes the degrees of freedom in the Student distribution, and the discount rate of 0.1605 per decade corresponds to an annual discount rate of 0.015. Our benchmark is column a in Table 8 . The model outputs are within credible bounds: policy variables at the beginning of period 0 (µ 0 , C 0 , I 0 ); stock variables at the beginning of period 1 (K 1 and also M 1 = 834.42 and H 1 = 0.8845); and expectations (E(µ 1 ), E(H 2 ), and also E(M 2 ) = 869.38). If we consider temperature H 2 as a function of ǫ 1 we find relatively low volatility in comparison to the confidence intervals proposed by the IPCC (2007, Chapter 10). The reason for this is twofold. First, the IPCC determines confidence intervals by considering multiple deterministic climate models, not a single stochastic one as we do. Second and more importantly, the IPCC confidence intervals are based on non-mitigation scenarios, while our model takes policy effects into account. For both reasons, the volatility in temperature found by the IPCC is higher than what we find.
Probability of catastrophe and value of statistical subsistence
In addition to the 'direct' outputs of our model we also have 'derived' outputs, in particular the probability of catastrophe. These derived outputs are functions of the direct outputs and they represent important policy variables on which prior information is available. Hence, they also require agreement. We propose to define catastrophe as the event C * 1 ≤ C for some given value C > 0. The probability of catastrophe is then given by π = Pr(C * 1 ≤ C). We shall consider three different values of C: C a , C b , and C c , corresponding to three levels of catastrophe, labeled A, B, and C. Catastrophe A occurs when 20% of the world population live in extreme poverty, and catastrophes B and C occur when 50% and 80% of the world population live in extreme poverty, respectively. (The definitions and priors proposed in this subsection are based on background material provided in Ikefuji et al. (2010c) and available at the project's website http://center.uvt.nl/staff/magnus/catastrophe.)
We must agree on acceptable values for the probability π of catastrophe. We have studied acceptable risks in various situations, and we conclude that an acceptable probability for an economy-climate catastrophe in the next 10-year period is in the range 10 −5 -10 −6 . Given the definition of catastrophe we propose: π a = 0.1, π b = 0.001, and π c = 0.00001 as reasonable values. There are of course other definitions of catastrophe. Barro and Ursúa (2008) define catastrophe as a peak-to-trough fall in per capita GDP of at least 15%, and find that the probability of this happening is approximately π = 0.017 per year. This does not relate directly to our π values, because GDP is not the same as consumption, Barro and Ursúa consider one year while we work with 10-year intervals, and, most importantly, because they only consider 21 'rich' countries. So, the numbers are difficult to compare. A situation where 20% of the world live in extreme poverty has in fact occurred before. The percentage of the world's population living in extreme poverty has halved since 1981. So a probability of π a = 0.1 seems reasonable.
In the benchmark model we find π a = 0.005, π b = 0.00002, and π c = 0.0000003, which is much lower than the acceptable values. Given the associated costs, it seems unnatural that policies would be chosen that mitigate the probability of a global economy-climate catastrophe far beyond acceptable levels. What can we do about this? One possibility is to make the tails heavier or lighter, that is, to adjust the degrees of freedom. If we set df = 25 then π becomes even smaller. In general, π becomes smaller as the tails become lighter (df increases), as one would expect. For df = ∞ (the normal distribution) we find π a = 2.3E−03, π b = 5.3E−10, and π c = 1.5E−24. Interestingly, the policy variables are hardly affected (column b), not even when df = 200 or df = ∞. If we set df = 3, which is the minimum value where var(ǫ 1 ) exists, then π a = 0.008, a little higher than for df = 10, but not enough. So, adjusting the degrees of freedom hardly changes the results.
Perhaps the fact that the heaviness of the tail (degrees of freedom) has little effect on the optimal policy is caused by the Burr utility function. Maybe this function does not distinguish well between light and heavy tails? In fact, this is not so. It follows from Figure 2 (and Section 4.2) that τ has much more impact than df. Hence the Burr function does distinguish between light and heavy tails.
Perhaps we should then adjust the value of τ . In our benchmark we set τ = 0.3 as a reasonable starting point. We could revise τ upwards. We argued in Section 3 and Figure 2 that τ = 0.7 is an upper bound to the volatility. Let us therefore consider the case τ = 0.5. A larger value of τ means more volatility and hence one would expect less consumption and more investment. This is indeed what happens (column c). Also, the probabilities are affected and are now much closer to our prior ideas.
We can also adjust the curvature k (and λ). If k increases, then agents become less risk-averse and, as expected, there is more consumption and less investment (column d ). The probabilities are not much different from our benchmark in a, but the values of µ 0 and µ 1 are very high and the capital stock accumulation rate is only 1.9% per year, which is too low.
Finally, we could adjust the discount rate ρ. This is an important issue (see, for example, Gollier, 2002 Gollier, , 2008 , and the references therein), with possibly significant (yet not 'discontinuous') impact on the optimal policies. It is, however, beyond the scope of this study.
Based on these comparisons it seems that policy c should be recommended. There is, however, one other derived output which is often discussed, namely the value of statistical life. If we agree on the definition of catastrophe, then we can also define the 'value of a statistical subsistence' (VSS) as the amount of consumption in period 0 that the government is willing to trade off in order to change the probability of catastrophe; see Ikefuji et al. (2010c) . The VSS is similar to the value of statistical life (VSL), except that it refers to the condition of just having enough food to stay alive (more than $1/day) rather than to life. We define (Ikefuji et al., 2010c) VSS = 1 ∂π(C 0 )/∂C 0 evaluated at C 0 = C * 0 . We propose VSS a = C 0 , VSS b = 10C 0 , and VSS c = 100C 0 as reasonable orders of magnitude. We first need to establish that the VSS exists. A little algebra shows that the VSS can be expressed as VSS = Γ 1 /Γ 2 with
and where π and all partial derivatives are evaluated at C 0 = C * 0 . Under Burr utility all expectations exist.
The VSS (and the VSL) is a difficult concept to measure, and the VSS priors may be unreliable. As such it should not carry too much weight as a derived output. Still we notice that the VSSs of our preferred policy c are much closer to our reasonable values than the VSSs in columns a, b, and d. The VSSs in column c are quite high though. Apparently society is willing to sacrifice 5C 0 to avoid catastrophe A and even 20,000C 0 to avoid catastrophe C. Perhaps our 'reasonable' values are too small. In fact, this is a well-known problem. Weitzman (2009) discusses it and he also mentions large values for the VSL without it being clear what the consequences are.
Robustness
If we believe that column c is the best, then we should do some further robustness checks, starting from column c rather than column a. We have done extensive robustness checks and some representative results of this analysis is reported in columns e-g of Table 8 . If we adjust the degrees of freedom (column e), then not much happens. There is little to choose between columns c and e. The optimal policy (µ * 0 , C * 0 , I * 0 ) is hardly affected, which is a good thing, because it means that our policy is not too sensitive to changes in the heaviness of the tail (degrees of freedom). In column f we consider τ = 0.7.
Here the probabilities of catastrophe seem to be too large. For example, we have π c = 0.0005 and it is doubtful if the government would find this acceptable. The choice of volatility τ does, however, affect the policy, and hence is important. We see that economics and statistics are bound together and difficult to separate. In column g we adjust the curvature of the Burr utility function. The probabilities are hardly affected but there will be more consumption, less investment, and in particular more (perhaps too much) abatement. On the basis of these and other robustness checks we conclude that policy c is robust against small changes in the underlying assumptions and parameter values.
Weitzman's dismal theorem
The previous discussion is closely related to an important debate initiated by Weitzman (2009) . In a highly stylized setting, Weitzman notices that heavytailed uncertainty and power utility are incompatible, as this combination of uncertainty and preferences implies an infinite pricing kernel. In order to avoid this, Weitzman introduces a lower bound on consumption. He then shows that this lower bound is related to a parameter that resembles the value of a statistical life, and proves that the pricing kernel approaches infinity as the value of this parameter approaches infinity (the 'dismal theorem'). Weitzman further argues that this 'VSL-like' parameter is hard to know, and interprets this result as follows: ". . . reasonable attempts to constrict the length or the heaviness of the 'bad' tail (or to modify the utility function) still can leave us with uncomfortably big numbers whose exact value depends non-robustly upon artificial constraints or parameters that we really do not understand." (Weitzman, 2009, p. 11) We agree with Weitzman that incompatible combinations of utility functions and distribution functions exist, in the sense that the pricing kernel or other important policy variables become infinite. In fact we derive necessary and sufficient conditions on the utility functions for the pricing kernel to exist (Appendix C). But we object to the dismal theorem for two reasons.
First, we think that the result is implied by using an incorrectly specified model. A key ingredient in Weitzman's model is the power utility function. This popular utility function is characterized by constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). The assumption of CRRA (hence RRA(0) > 0) is not appropriate when dealing with extremely low levels of consumption, and it is exactly the behavior at these low consumption levels that leads to the dismal theorem. As we have demonstrated in Section 4, Weitzman's result is avoided when the economic model (utility function) is compatible with the statistical model (heavy tails). Utility functions with appropriate risk aversion for low levels of consumption are not subject to the dismal theorem.
Second, more effort can be made to know an input parameter that is 'hard to know', and we describe a (stylized) learning-and-agreement procedure for precisely this purpose in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. Although it is difficult to state upper and lower bounds for the 'VSL-like' input parameter, we can still obtain reasonable constraints on difficult-to-know parameters of interest indirectly. The economic model translates the parameter of interest into output variables with an easier interpretation (such as the optimal policies and the probability of catastrophe). Bounds on these output variables, together with the economic model, imply bounds on the parameter of interest.
Conclusions
Our strategy in this paper has been to first specify and analyze a stochastic economy-climate model using the popular power utility function. Section 3 demonstrates explicitly that power utility is fragile with respect to distributional assumptions. This is not unexpected. Weitzman (2009) summarizes this fragility and the non-existence of a robust solution in a 'dismal' theorem. We agree with Weitzman's concerns about the validity of expected utility analysis in settings featuring catastrophic risks. We argue that one should indeed allow for heavy-tailed distributions when modeling catastrophic climate changes, but that, in contrast to Weitzman, heavy-tailed distributional assumptions are not per se irreconcilable with expected utility.
Based on general results regarding the relationship between the richness of the class of utility functions and the generality of the permitted distributional assumptions (Section 4 and Appendix C), we then restrict ourselves to utility functions that are compatible with our distributional assumptions. In Section 4 we propose that on the domain that contains the typically observed consumption levels, the utility function behaves power-like (CRRA) as is popular in macroeconomics and finance, while on the remote domain containing extreme adverse consumption shocks, the utility function exhibits exponential-like (CARA) features as is popular in insurance. Thus we avoid the unacceptable conclusion that society should sacrifice an unlimited amount of consumption to reduce the probability of catastrophic climate change by even a small amount. After reaching agreement on the model parameters, the sensitivity analysis conducted in Section 5 shows that our completed model and the resulting optimal policies are quite robust and sensibly sensitive. With quasi exponential-like behavior of the utility function in near-catastrophe situations, extreme sensitivities that would otherwise be present using CRRA preferences are avoided.
Much of the analysis in our paper is not limited to extreme climate change. A similar analysis could apply in other policy making settings involving catastrophic risks, such as the development of new financial incentive schemes to mitigate the risk of extreme systemic failures and resulting financial economic crises, or policies concerning medical risks (pandemic flu and vaccination risks).
Let us finally admit four limitations of our paper, and indicate possible generalizations. First, from Section 4 onwards, we have focussed our attention on bounded utility functions, so as to avoid having to restrict distributional assumptions. In general, one could assume more structure on stochasticity (yet still allow for heavy tails) and broaden the constraints on utility. In particular, unbounded utility (such as HARA with 0 < α ≤ 1; see Ikefuji et al., 2010b ) is also permitted under additional assumptions on stochasticity. Second, for simplicity and clarity of presentation, we have restricted our analysis to only two periods. In principle, much of our analysis will remain intact when considering more than two periods. Third, to account for the fact that the policy maker has the double objective of maximizing current consumption, while also leaving a reasonable economy for the next policy maker, we have used scrap values in our analysis. We ignore, however, stochasticity in the scrap value function after the second period. The development of a numerically tractable economy-climate model with multiperiod stochasticity and scrap values is left for future research. Finally, the equations making up our stochastic economy-climate model are of a simple and stylized nature, and each one of them, including the specification of stochasticity, leaves room for generalizations and extensions.
Appendices A Kuhn-Tucker conditions under positive investment
Consider the economy-climate model of Section 2 in the two-period set-up of Section 3. Let U be a general well-behaved utility function and let S
and S (2) be general well-behaved scrap value functions. At the beginning of period 1 our welfare function, conditional on (C 0 , µ 0 , ǫ 1 ), is
We have four constraints: C 1 ≥ 0, I 1 ≥ 0, µ 1 ≥ 0, and µ 1 ≤ 1, but only two of these can be binding as we shall see. Hence, we define the Lagrangian
and we find
and
where
This leads to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
together with the slackness conditions κ 1 I 1 = 0 and κ 2 (1 − µ 1 ) = 0.
Under the assumption that I 1 > 0 we have κ 1 = 0 and we distinguish between two cases, as follows.
Case (1): κ 2 > 0. We have µ 1 = 1 and g 2 = g 2 (1), and we solve two equations in two unknowns:
under the restrictions:
Case (2): κ 2 = 0. We solve four equations in four unknowns:
The following two points are worth noting. First, we see that the restrictions µ 1 ≥ 0 and C 1 ≥ 0 are automatically satisfied, so that they do not need to be imposed. Second, we see that U ′ (C 1 /L 1 ) = ν 1 g 1 in both cases. This fact will be used in Appendix B.
B Proof of Proposition 3.1
We shall prove the proposition both for the linear scrap and the non-linear scrap case. In both cases the inequality constraints (2) are imposed. Since
, we obtain C *
Linear scrap under normality. Linear scrap implies that S (1) (K 2 ) = K 2 and S (2) (M 2 ) = M 2 . Since E(e τ ǫ 1 ) exists under normality, it follows that C * 1 , I * 1 , K * 2 , and M * 2 all have finite expectations, and therefore that E(W * ) exists if and only E(1/C * 1 ) exists. For notational convenience we do not distinguish between the random variable ǫ 1 and its realization. With this slight abuse of notation, we write
(1/C * 1 ) dF (ǫ 1 ).
Since E(e −τ ǫ 1 ) is finite, it suffices to show that I * 1 >0
(1/C * 1 ) dF (ǫ 1 ) is finite. Now, it follows from Appendix A that, under the assumption that I *
Nonlinear scrap under normality. Nonlinear scrap implies that
where p > 0 and q > 1. Since
we see that E(W * ) exists if and only E(1/C * 1 ) exists. As in the linear scrap case, it suffices to show that I * 1 >0
(1/C * 1 ) dF (ǫ 1 ) is finite. Since
it follows from Appendix A that, under the assumption that I * 1 > 0,
, and hence that
Student distribution. From (12) we have 1/C * 1 ≥ e −τ ǫ 1 /B 1 . Under a Student distribution, the right-hand side has no finite expectation, and hence the left-hand side has no finite expectation either. In the non-linear scrap case, this is sufficient to prove the non-existence of E(W * ) because S (1) (K * 2 ) and S (2) (M * 2 ) are both bounded. In the linear scrap case, M * 2 is bounded, but K * 2 is not. Now, since
we obtain
Since G is monotonically increasing from −∞ to +∞, there exists a unique
C Expected utility and tail uncertainty
We now formulate our decision under uncertainty problem in Savage (1954) style, independent of the specific model considered in this paper, so that the results obtained below are generally applicable. We fix a set S of states of nature and we let A denote a σ-algebra of subsets of S. One state is the true state. We also fix a set C of consequences (outcomes, consumption) endowed with a σ-algebra F . Since we are only interested in monetary outcomes, we may take C = R + . A decision alternative (policy bundle) X is a measurable mapping from S to C, so that X −1 (A) ∈ A for all events A ∈ F . We assume that the class of all decision alternatives X is endowed with a preference order .
Definition C.1 We say that expected utility (EU) holds if there exists a measurable and strictly increasing function U : C → R on the space of consequences, referred to as the utility function, and a probability measure P on A, such that the preference order on X is represented by a functional V of the form X → S U(X(s)) dP = V (X). Thus, the decision alternative X ∈ X is preferred to the decision alternative Y ∈ X if, and only if, V (X) ≥ V (Y ).
In the Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) framework, utility U is subjective, whereas the probability measure P associated with A is objective and known beforehand (decision under risk). In the more general framework of Savage (1954) adopted here, the probability measure itself can be, but need not be, subjective (decision under uncertainty).
Definition C.2 We say that a risk ǫ : S → R is heavy-tailed to the left (right) under P if its moment-generating function is infinite: E (e γǫ ) = ∞ for any γ < 0 (γ > 0).
Examples of heavy-tailed risks are the Student, lognormal, and Pareto distributions. Heavy-tailed risks provide appropriate mathematical models for low-probability high-impact events, such as environmental catastrophes.
Proposition C.1 If EU is to discriminate univocally among all possible alternative outcome distributions, the utility function must be bounded.
Proof: See Menger (1934, p. 468) in the context of St. Petersburg-type lotteries, and also Arrow (1974) and Gilboa (2009, pp. 108-109) . Menger (implicitly) assumes boundedness from below and demonstrates that boundedness from above should hold, and it is straightforward to generalize his result to an a priori unrestricted setting.
Proposition C.1 states that the EU functional is finite for all outcome distributions if, and only if, the utility function is bounded. Moreover, the axiomatization of EU is valid for all outcome distributions if, and only if, the utility function is bounded. The implications are non-trivial: boundedness of the utility function must hold not just in exotic situations but also in more familiar and economically relevant settings involving high levels of uncertainty. (See Moscadelli (2004) regarding operational risk.) In what follows we do not require the utility function to be bounded. We simply assume that the class of feasible outcome distributions is restricted (though the restriction may be void) in such a way that the utility function permits discrimination among them. Recall from (5) that RRA(x) = −xU ′′ (x)/U ′ (x) and ARA(x) = −U ′′ (x)/U ′ (x), and let
ARA(x). Now consider a representative agent with time-additive EU preferences and time-preference parameter ρ > 0. We normalize (without loss of generality) the agent's consumption C by setting C 0 = 1, and we define the pricing kernel (intertemporal marginal rate of substitution) as
where C * 1 is optimal consumption at t = 1. Consumption C 1 is commonly restricted to a budget-feasible consumption set which is subject to uncertainty (ǫ 1 ). We assume that the budget restriction takes the general form C * 1 (ǫ 1 ) ≤ B exp(Aǫ 1 ), B, A > 0,
which need not be best-possible. (In our economy-climate model of Section 2 as well as in the two-period setup of Section 3, B = B 1 and A = τ .) The expectation E(P ) represents the amount of consumption in period 0 that the representative agent is willing to give up in order to obtain one additional certain unit of consumption in period 1. The following result states that the expectation of the pricing kernel is finite for all outcome distributions whenever the concavity index (ArrowPratt index, index of absolute risk aversion) ARA(x) is bounded.
Proposition C.2 Assume that EU holds and that the budget feasibility restriction (14) applies. (a) If α * > 0 and ǫ 1 is heavy-tailed to the left under P, then E(P ) = ∞; (b) If β * < ∞ and α * = 0, then E(P ) < ∞ for any ǫ 1 .
Proof: Let α * > 0. The EU maximizer is then more risk-averse in the sense of Arrow-Pratt than an agent with power (CRRA) utility of index α * . It follows from (13) e −τ α * ǫ 1 dF (ǫ 1 ) = ∞, using (14) and the fact that ǫ 1 is heavy-tailed to the left. This proves part (a). Intuitively, if agent 1 is more risk-averse in the sense of Arrow-Pratt than agent 2, and if it is optimal to postpone all consumption for agent 2, then this will also be optimal for agent 1. Next let α * = 0 and β * < ∞. The EU maximizer is then less risk-averse in the sense of Arrow-Pratt than an agent with exponential (CARA) utility of index β * . Since α * = 0, we have 0 ≤ ARA(x) ≤ β * and hence E(P ) = If the EU maximizer has decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing relative risk aversion, as is commonly assumed, a complete and elegant characterization of boundedness of the expected pricing kernel can be obtained, as follows.
Proposition C.3 Assume that EU holds and that the budget feasibility restriction (14) applies. Assume furthermore that RRA(x) exists and is nonnegative and non-decreasing for all x ≥ 0 and that ARA(x) is non-increasing for all x > 0. Then, E(P ) < ∞ for any ǫ 1 if and only if γ 0 ARA(x) dx < ∞ for some γ > 0.
Proof: To prove the 'only if' part, we assume that γ 0 ARA(x) dx is infinite for every γ > 0, and then show that there exist (S, A, P) and ǫ 1 defined on it such that E(P ) = ∞. We note that β * = ∞. Strict monotonicity of g implies its invertibility. Hence we can choose u to be any non-negative random variable whose expectation does not exist (for example, the absolute value of a Cauchy distribution), and then define ǫ 1 through B 1 e τ ǫ 1 = g −1 (u + 1). With such a choice of ǫ 1 we have E(P ) = ∞. To prove the 'if'-part we assume that ARA(x) dx = ∞ for some γ > 0, both α * > 0 and α * = 0 can hold. If α * > 0 then we do not need the full force of Proposition C.3; it is sufficient that ǫ 1 is heavy-tailed to the left. Then E(P ) = ∞ by Proposition C.2(a). If α * = 0 then heavy-tailedness alone is not sufficient, but we can always find an ǫ 1 such that E(P ) = ∞. An example of an ARA satisfying γ 0 ARA(x) dx = ∞ and α * = 0 is a function which behaves as −1/(x log x) for values of x close to 0 and in addition satisfies the conditions of the proposition. ARA(x) dx < ∞ to hold is that there exists 0 ≤ δ < 1 such that lim sup x↓0 x δ ARA(x) < ∞.
